Is Tehran Betting It Can Outlast Trump?
Grinfi Political Risk Brief
Good Morning!
Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence.
Now, on a lighter note, let’s start the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.
High Impact Situational Updates
From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week.
Situation as of this morning: Global markets are rattled again, with Brent crude trading near $84 a barrel, up roughly 1% from Friday’s close, after Iran raised the political price of reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Over the weekend, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, published six preconditions for reopening the waterway. They include:
End all US threats against Iran
Permanently stop military actions against Iran and its allies (Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, Iraq)
Lift the US naval blockade on Iranian ports
Withdraw all US naval and air forces from the region
Pay full compensation/reparation for war damage
Remove all sanctions and unconditionally release frozen Iranian assets
But what could possibly be Tehran’s motive with these new, seemingly unrealistic requests? From all indications, Tehran knows these demands are deliberately maximalist and appear designed to prevent any quick resolution. The United States cannot realistically meet conditions such as full military withdrawal or war reparations without abandoning its regional commitments.
The Iran-Oman Technical Deal. In fact, before publishing its demands, Iran and Oman had reached a technical agreement on a temporary shipping route through the strait, with agreed geographic coordinates. However, Iran immediately clarified that this technical plan does not mean the strait will reopen. Ships will not be allowed safe passage until the US satisfies Iran’s broader political demands. This approach, it seems, lets Iran maintain diplomatic cover while keeping the waterway closed.
Iran’s Strategy. Above all, Tehran is deliberately prolonging negotiations (probably frustrated with US duplicity during previous negotiations), calculating that time works in its favor. By keeping energy markets unstable and oil prices elevated, Iran aims to create economic pressure on the US ahead of the November midterm elections. Iranian leaders believe a politically weakened White House will be forced to negotiate on more favorable terms after the elections.
This strategy is low‑cost for Iran, which relies on inexpensive assets such as anti‑ship missiles and naval mines, while the United States must sustain far more expensive naval and air deployments. This also comes on the heels of recently leaked reports that U.S. missile‑interceptor stockpile has fallen to dangerously low levels.
However, Iran equally faces risks. Rising internal divisions between moderates and hardliners, severe domestic inflation, and the possibility that a post-election US administration may choose escalation over negotiation are key concerns.
Trump’s language this weekend fits a similar wait-and-see posture on the US side. He told Axios in an interview published Sunday that the US is “low-keying it” with Iran and only “semi-negotiating,” and described Tehran as constrained by “huge inflation” and “no money.” Both sides currently appear to see more value in managing the standoff than in resolving it, which is the more likely course for the next several weeks than any near-term breakthrough.
This is unfolding against a domestic backdrop that narrows the Federal Reserve’s options. July payrolls fell by 23,000 against consensus expectations for a gain near 85,000, with May and June revised down by a combined 103,000, and wage growth slowed to