Good Morning!

Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence.

Now, on a lighter note, let’s start the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.

Humor of the Week

High Impact Situational Updates

From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week.

— The US president has offered voters cash to keep his party in office and suggested Congress has no say in the matter. Is this political bribery?

— A Federal Reserve chair hired to cut rates is heading into this week’s meeting with all the economic data pointing toward a hike. Will he derail the Trumpapalooza?

— Yemen’s Houthi militia has completed a four day advance along the Red Sea coast, capturing the port of Mocha, the Hanish Islands and, most recently, Perim Island. This has given the Houthis greater control over the Bab el Mandeb Strait, alongside the existing threat they pose to the Strait of Hormuz.

— And the people building the world’s most capable AI systems have spent the week publicly warning that they are not confident they can safely control what they are creating. Is Killer AI here to stay, and have we already developed our own existential menace?

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Situation this morning. Americans are still trying to make sense of what President Trump said at the Republican Party’s midterm convention in Dallas last week. The U.S president pledged $5,000 to every American adult if Republicans retain control of both chambers of Congress in November.

Vice President Vance clarified the reasoning underpinning the proposal that same night in an interview with Fox News. If Republicans keep control of Congress, Vance said, Americans would “share in some of the benefit” of the wealth being created. Put simply, the $5,000 is being offered as a “compensation” for keeping Republicans in power.

Legal opinion is divided on what to call this. Some describe it as coming “dangerously close, if not over the line, into political bribery.” Others cite Brown v. Hartlage, the 1982 Supreme Court decision holding that a candidate’s promise of broad financial benefit to all voters is not itself unlawful, and liken the pledge to an ordinary promise to cut taxes.

Trump then went further. Asked by CBS News whether the payments would require congressional approval, he said: “Well, we think not. I think they will do it if we needed it. But we think not.” House Speaker Mike Johnson corrected him days later, stating that congressional approval is in fact required, while pledging to pursue it regardless. This is not the only recent instance of the president suggesting Congress is optional.

At the same time, the administration’s record with this kind of promise is worth noting. This would be the third payment pledged, despite the previous two never materializing. A “DOGE dividend,” floated with Elon Musk in February 2025. Then came a $2,000 “tariff dividend,” promised on Truth Social that November. Noticeably, each iteration is always larger than the last. Yet, none has been paid.

If anything, US history offers a useful precedent. Many Americans can still remember what happened the last time a political leader proposed handing out cash this directly during a crucial election. In 1972, Democratic Senator George McGovern from South Dakota ran on a “demogrant,” a proposed $1,000 annual payment to every American, worth roughly $8,000 today. Republicans seized on it immediately.

In fact, one of Nixon’s most effective campaign television ads showed a construction worker looking down from a skyscraper, saying: “McGovern wants to put everybody on welfare. I still believe in the right to work. It’s sacred.” The proposal contributed to one of the largest electoral defeats in

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Good Morning!

Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence.

Now, on a lighter note, let’s start the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.

Humor of the Week

High Impact Situational Updates

From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week.

Honestly, there are probably several factors at play. Among them are global conflicts, including the current Iran war and the Russia-Ukraine war, which are pushing oil prices higher and increasing freight and logistics costs across global supply chains. Those higher costs eventually feed into the prices consumers pay, adding to inflation.

Higher inflation can push bond yields higher as investors demand a greater return for lending to governments over 10 or 30 years when they expect prices to remain elevated. Those higher yields then feed into the wider economy, making mortgages and corporate borrowing more expensive because both are closely linked to government borrowing costs. For governments, the effects build further. Higher borrowing costs increase debt service, leaving less fiscal room to respond to new pressures. For the most part, that is already the case, making difficult political choices even harder, from Washington to Paris to London and beyond.

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Situation as of this morning. Global bond markets are still having a rough week. The US 10 year Treasury yield closed near 4.78% yesterday, the UK 10 year gilt is above 5.2%, Japan’s 10 year yield has reached 3% for the first time since 1996, and French borrowing costs remain elevated relative to Germany. Alongside other domestic factors, these markets are strongly feeling the backlashes of the Iran war, which continues to intensify. Several central banks are now taking a more hawkish stance as the conflict adds to inflationary pressure, making them less likely to move toward rate cuts.

The Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan are all now expected to raise rates this month. The ECB is widely expected to announce

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Situation as of this morning: Oil prices are up roughly 2% in early trading after U.S. forces struck Iranian rocket launchers on Larak Island yesterday. Brent crude rose above $90 a barrel, while U.S. West Texas Intermediate also gained more than 2%. The strike was the first known American military action against Iran in more than a month, and came after U.S. officials said the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was preparing to launch rockets carrying sea mines into the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran’s IRGC said the Sunday strike on Larak Island caused casualties and vowed retaliation. Hours later, Iran launched a combined ballistic missile and drone attack on two U.S. air bases in Jordan (King Hussein and Al Azraq). Iranian officials noted that the attacks targeted maintenance infrastructure and areas where fighter jets were stationed. A tanker was also struck by an unidentified projectile while transiting the Strait of Hormuz on Sunday. Shipping data showed that vessel traffic through the strait had fallen to just five transits a day over the weekend.

The U.S. pre-emptive attack yesterday comes on the heels of an already alarming week. Last week, an IRGC-linked Iranian state television channel aired a video titled “Where to Kill Barron Trump?” In the video, the IRGC claimed to track the movements and security arrangements of President Trump’s 20 year old son and reportedly provided details about his whereabouts. It also offered a $10 million bounty for his assassination. The threat has prompted the Secret Service to take the matter seriously, particularly as political tensions in the United States continue to rise.

At the same time, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s son Yair was urgently evacuated from Miami and returned to Israel after Israeli security officials identified a significant threat to his life. The evacuation came days after Netanyahu said that Iran had attempted to assassinate one of his sons.

But first, let’s head to South America,

Authorities in Caracas have confirmed that Venezuela has signed a sweeping oil agreement giving Washington majority control over 65 billion barrels of proven reserves, spanning 17 strategic fields, in a deal interim President Delcy Rodríguez called “historic” and central to the “rebirth of the nation.”

Rodríguez said Saturday that the 25-year agreement targets crude output of 1.5 million barrels a day, up from Venezuela’s current 1.23 million, the highest level since 2019. She estimated state revenue at roughly $209 billion over the life of the deal, based on a $65 benchmark oil price, with about $19 a barrel flowing directly to Venezuela. The United States secures 55% of production from the fields, blending equity stakes with below-market purchase rights earmarked for the U.S. strategic reserve and military. Chevron is reportedly among the companies expected to finalize terms to fold its existing joint ventures into the new framework.

The situation, however, has raised serious constitutional questions. Venezuela’s 1999 Constitution (Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela) states plainly in Article 12, that “mineral and hydrocarbon deposits of any nature that exist within the territory of the nation... are the property of the Republic, are of public domain, and therefore inalienable and not transferable.” Article 302 reserves the petroleum industry to the state “for reasons of national expediency,” while Article 303 says the state shall retain all shares of PDVSA “for reasons of economic and political sovereignty and national strategy.”

Rodríguez’s government argues that a 2026 amendment to the Organic Hydrocarbons Law permits operational access contracts like this one without violating those provisions, since ownership of the reserves technically remains with the state even as the U.S. secures majority control of production and revenue. But, as some critics have pointed out, this appears to be a pedantic distinction without much of a difference. In fact, Harvard economist Ricardo Hausmann, a former Venezuelan planning minister, called it a “shameful deal,” declaring that Rodríguez “has no legitimacy or constitutional power to commit Venezuela to any such deal.”

The deal is the clearest marker yet of how far Venezuela has moved under Washington’s orbit since U.S. forces captured Nicolás Maduro in a January raid and installed his former vice president, Rodríguez, as interim leader. Nearly nine months on, oil exports to the U.S. have surged to a seven-year high near 630,000 barrels a day, while shipments to China and India have fallen sharply as cargoes are redirected north.

But the new agreement’s headline revenue promises sit uneasily alongside an older, unresolved and jarring question. Where is the oil money already collected?

A Financial Times investigation in July found that Washington had generated roughly $13 billion in Venezuelan oil revenue since the January takeover, yet only about $300 million had been

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Good Morning!

Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence.

Now, on a lighter note, let’s start the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.

Humor of the Week

High Impact Situational Updates

From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week.

Situation as of this morning: Canadians are waking up today to the reality that their country and the United States are, in effect, at war economically. A 50% U.S. tariff on roughly C$28 billion (about US$20 billion) of Canadian goods took hold over the weekend under Section 338 authority, after trade talks collapsed late Friday.

The new levies hit wine, dairy, cement, clothing and hockey equipment, among other goods, covering about 5% of Canadian exports to the U.S. Most Canadian goods normally cross the border duty free under USMCA, but the newly listed products will now be required to pay the

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Good Morning!

Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence.

Now, on a lighter note, let’s start the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.

Humor of the Week

High Impact Situational Updates

From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week.

Situation as of this morning: Oil is holding in the high $80s as markets open this week, after Brent rose from $84 to nearly $90 last week following renewed tanker attacks and a hardening Iranian position on the Strait of Hormuz. But with Iran’s military now offering a $30,000 bounty for anyone who kills or captures a U.S. soldier, with the reward doubled if carried out by a woman, and Trump seeking to rekindle his long lost political romance with Kim Jong Un while simultaneously floating the idea of declaring the Strait of Hormuz a U.S. territory, what is the war now costing the United States? And as the U.S.-Iran truce is set to expire today, does Washington really have a strategy?

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More importantly, is the Iran war undercutting U.S. policy in the Indo Pacific? On all fronts, the situation is getting messier, and the evidence is incontrovertibly harder to deflect or unsee. The USS George Washington left the Pacific over the weekend to relieve the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Middle East, whose nearly nine (9) month deployment has drawn serious concern over the physical and mental toll on its sailors. The Lincoln has reportedly spent more than 250 consecutive days at sea without a port call, while sailors and their families have raised concerns about poor living conditions and worsening mental health, including reports of multiple attempts to go overboard.

With the USS George Washington now heading to the Middle East, that redeployment leaves the western Pacific without a U.S. aircraft carrier for the first time in years, just as China is showing growing signs of

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Good Morning!

Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence.

Now, on a lighter note, let’s start the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.

Humor of the Week

High Impact Situational Updates

From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week.

Situation as of this morning: Global markets are rattled again, with Brent crude trading near $84 a barrel, up roughly 1% from Friday’s close, after Iran raised the political price of reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Over the weekend, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, published six preconditions for reopening the waterway. They include:

1. End all US threats against Iran

2. Permanently stop military actions against Iran and its allies (Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, Iraq)

3. Lift the US naval blockade on Iranian ports

4. Withdraw all US naval and air forces from the region

5. Pay full compensation/reparation for war damage

6. Remove all sanctions and unconditionally release frozen Iranian assets

But what could possibly be Tehran’s motive with these new, seemingly unrealistic requests? From all indications, Tehran knows these demands are deliberately maximalist and appear designed to prevent any quick resolution. The United States cannot realistically meet conditions such as full military withdrawal or war reparations without abandoning its regional commitments.

The Iran-Oman Technical Deal. In fact, before publishing its demands, Iran and Oman had reached a technical agreement on a temporary shipping route through the strait, with agreed geographic coordinates. However, Iran immediately clarified that this technical plan does not mean the strait will reopen. Ships will not be allowed safe passage until the US satisfies Iran’s broader political demands. This approach, it seems, lets Iran maintain diplomatic cover while keeping the waterway closed.

Iran’s Strategy. Above all, Tehran is deliberately prolonging negotiations (probably frustrated with US duplicity during previous negotiations), calculating that time works in its favor. By keeping energy markets unstable and oil prices elevated, Iran aims to create economic pressure on the US ahead of the November midterm elections. Iranian leaders believe a politically weakened White House will be forced to negotiate on more favorable terms after the elections.

This strategy is low‑cost for Iran, which relies on inexpensive assets such as anti‑ship missiles and naval mines, while the United States must sustain far more expensive naval and air deployments. This also comes on the heels of recently leaked reports that U.S. missile‑interceptor stockpile has fallen to dangerously low levels.

However, Iran equally faces risks. Rising internal divisions between moderates and hardliners, severe domestic inflation, and the possibility that a post-election US administration may choose escalation over negotiation are key concerns.

Trump’s language this weekend fits a similar wait-and-see posture on the US side. He told Axios in an interview published Sunday that the US is “low-keying it” with Iran and only “semi-negotiating,” and described Tehran as constrained by “huge inflation” and “no money.” Both sides currently appear to see more value in managing the standoff than in resolving it, which is the more likely course for the next several weeks than any near-term breakthrough.

This is unfolding against a domestic backdrop that narrows the Federal Reserve’s options. July payrolls fell by 23,000 against consensus expectations for a gain near 85,000, with May and June revised down by a combined 103,000, and wage growth slowed to

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Good Morning!

Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence.

Now, on a lighter note, let’s start the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.

Humor of the Week

High Impact Situational Updates

From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week.

Situation as of this morning. Oman-mediated talks with Iran have produced the first credible path toward a limited maritime route through the Strait of Hormuz after five months of conflict. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei confirmed discussions with Oman on a “third route” that respects sovereign rights on both sides. In a related development, President Trump canceled planned strikes for this week, citing progress and requests from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. He conditioned any deal on full reopening of the strait and an end to Iran’s nuclear threat.

Iran has made clear that any arrangement would not restore pre-conflict free passage. IRGC hardliners remain opposed. Oil prices have eased from earlier peaks and currently trade closer to the low-to-mid $80s, though residual risk and insurance costs are keeping markets sensitive.

In the U.S., attention now turns to Michigan’s statewide primary, slated for tomorrow, August 4, where voters will choose nominees for an open governor’s race and an open U.S. Senate seat. Progressive candidate Abdul El-Sayed is running as a Mamdani-style challenger against

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Good Morning!

Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence.

Now, on a lighter note, let’s start the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.

Humor of the Week

High Impact Situational Updates

From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week.

Situation as of this morning- Markets are opening cautiously today as concerns over a potential “trade war 2.0” intensified following the Trump administration’s implementation of sweeping new tariffs late last week. Effective Friday, July 24, the United States imposed levies ranging from 10% to 12.5% on imports from more than 60 nations, covering nearly all American trade volume (~ 99.4% of U.S. imports). The administration is bypassing previous legal hurdles by invoking Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, framing the duties as penalties for failures to police forced labor in supply chains.

While allies such as Canada and the UK face a 10% baseline rate, major competitors including China and Brazil are subject to the 12.5% ceiling. The move has drawn immediate condemnation from the European Union, which rejects the forced‑labor justification as a pretext for protectionism.

Trade War Escalates with Canada. Meanwhile, tensions with Canada have also reached a breaking point beyond the baseline tariffs. Last Monday (July 20), President Trump invoked Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to impose a punitive 50% tariff on approximately $20 billion in specific Canadian goods, including wine, cement, dairy, and hockey sticks. In a stark diplomatic rebuke, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney canceled the joint opening ceremony for the Gordie Howe International Bridge, labeling the US actions a direct violation of the USMCA. The Trump administration argues these measures counter “discriminatory” Canadian practices, but allies warn of severe supply chain disruptions.

Economic and Legal Ramifications. The reintroduction of broad tariffs is already triggering market volatility and stoking inflation fears. A new Harris Poll commissioned by the Guardian reveals that 70% of Americans believe

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Good Morning!

Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence. Thorough, insightful, and industry-focused. We deliver clarity in uncertainty and strength in decision-making. Anticipate, Adapt, and Excel!

Now, on a lighter note, let’s start the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.

Humor of the Week

From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here’s what we’re monitoring:

High Impact Situational Updates

“At Grinfi, we track immediate fragility and systemic contagion to ensure leaders see risks before they spread.”

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week.

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Situation as of this morning. Iran has now formally withdrawn from the Islamabad Memorandum. Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi announced Saturday that Tehran no longer considers itself bound by any of its commitments under the deal.

At the same time, the U.S. death toll is steadily rising. The U.S. military confirmed Sunday that another American service member was killed as part of the war, bringing the total to 17. The latest fatality followed the deaths of two service members in Jordan on Saturday, where U.S. forces were defending against Iranian ballistic missile and drone attacks.

Ground forces now officially on the table?

For the first time in this conflict, a ground option is being

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Good Morning!

Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence. Thorough, insightful, and industry-focused. We deliver clarity in uncertainty and strength in decision-making. Anticipate, Adapt, and Excel!

Now, on a lighter note, let’s start the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.

Humor of the Week

From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here’s what we’re monitoring:

High Impact Situational Updates

“At Grinfi, we track immediate fragility and systemic contagion to ensure leaders see risks before they spread.”

---

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week.

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Is the Islamabad Memorandum already dead? Aside from the political optics, was it ever alive in substance to begin with? These are the questions many are asking as the US-Iran ceasefire, barely three weeks old, took on water. President Trump declared the truce "over" on July 7, after Iranian strikes hit three tankers near the Strait of Hormuz. He softened the line a day later, saying he didn't want a return to full-scale war. BUT, as is customary with Trump, that softening didn't last either.

Situation as of this morning. The Strait of Hormuz is closed for the

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Good Morning!

Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence. Thorough, insightful, and industry-focused. We deliver clarity in uncertainty and strength in decision-making. Anticipate, Adapt, and Excel!

Now, on a lighter note, let’s start the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.

Humor of the Week

From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here’s what we’re monitoring:

High Impact Situational Updates

“At Grinfi, we track immediate fragility and systemic contagion to ensure leaders see risks before they spread.”

---

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week.

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For the first time in Israel’s 78-year history, its government has told the Supreme Court, in writing, that it will not obey a ruling. The cabinet voted unanimously yesterday, July 5, to disregard a High Court order. Legal scholars, opposition leaders and even some of Netanyahu’s former military chiefs are now calling it a genuine and unprecedented constitutional crisis. It comes roughly ten (10) weeks before Israelis are expected to vote, and it raises a question the country has never had to answer before.

That question, precisely, is what happens when the executive branch refuses to accept that the judiciary has the final word? But how, and why, did the situation reach this point?

A broadcast regulator and an “unlawful” ruling

Israel’s Second Authority for Television and Radio, which regulates commercial broadcasters was due to weigh in on the sale of Channel 13, one of the country’s major networks. Enough of its members resigned that it fell below the two-thirds quorum the law requires to operate. Communications Minister Shlomo Karhi and Justice Minister Yariv Levin argued the council was therefore defunct. On June 17, the High Court disagreed, ruling that the resignations had been engineered by the government’s own “deliberate obstruction,” and ordered the council to keep functioning until the underlying petitions are resolved.

The cabinet responded on Sunday by voting to treat every decision, appointment or approval made by the council as null and void. Levin called it a defense of legality rather than a challenge to it, arguing that the rule of law binds every branch of government, including judges, and that a court cannot claim authority the Knesset never granted it. Karhi was blunter, calling the council’s rulings worthless and accusing the justices of overreach.

Opposition leaders see it differently. Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid said a government

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Good Morning!

Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence. Thorough, insightful, and industry-focused. We deliver clarity in uncertainty and strength in decision-making. Anticipate, Adapt, and Excel!

Now, on a lighter note, let’s start the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.

Humor of the Week

From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here’s what we’re monitoring:

High Impact Situational Updates

“At Grinfi, we track immediate fragility and systemic contagion to ensure leaders see risks before they spread.”

---

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week.

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With six (6) prime ministers resigning in the last decade, is surviving Downing Street now the ultimate test of political grit? Does the modern UK PM need a vision for the future, or just the resilience to survive the week?

Last week, Keir Starmer resigned as Labour leader and Prime Minister, triggering a leadership contest, with nominations set to open on July 9. He bowed to intense pressure following Andy Burnham's decisive victory in the Makerfield by election just four days earlier. However, Starmer said he would remain in office until a successor is chosen. His net approval rating had averaged -46% by November 2025, and by the end of the year he was regarded as one of Britain’s most unpopular prime ministers on record. Labour’s performance in the May 2026 local elections proved disastrous. The party lost more than 1,400 council seats, the largest loss in its history, and lost control of the Welsh Senedd for the first time in more than a century.

Starmer had come under sustained criticism for reversing early policy commitments, including cutting winter fuel payments for pensioners, while failing to reverse economic stagnation. Despite pledges to reduce the cost of living and revive growth, inflation remained elevated, wage growth was eroded by frozen tax thresholds, and housing targets were repeatedly missed. Many critics argued that his government lacked a clear ideological direction and failed to connect emotionally with voters in the way that populist rivals, particularly Nigel Farage’s Reform UK, had managed to do. The local election results ultimately convinced many Labour MPs that Starmer could no longer lead the party into the next general election.

Against this backdrop, Burnham’s path to the leadership required an unusual constitutional maneuver. As Mayor of Greater Manchester, he was not a sitting MP and was therefore ineligible to contest the Labour leadership. To overcome that obstacle, Makerfield MP Josh Simons resigned his seat, allowing Burnham to contest the by election, return to Parliament, and qualify for the leadership race. Burnham won the June 18 contest by more than 9,200 votes, comfortably outperforming polls that had projected only a narrow victory over Reform UK. He was sworn into Parliament on the same day Starmer announced his resignation.

With his parliamentary seat secured, Burnham quickly consolidated support across the party. By June 20, he had received the backing of more than 200 Labour MPs. Former Health Secretary Wes Streeting, widely regarded as his principal rival, endorsed Burnham immediately after he announced his candidacy rather than entering the race himself. If no other candidate secures the required 81 MP nominations by the July 16 deadline, Burnham will become Labour leader and Prime Minister without a membership vote, potentially entering Downing Street as early as July 17.

What Would a Burnham Premiership Mean?

Burnham is not a typical figure of Labour’s left in the Corbynite tradition. He is a “soft left” pragmatist and a strong advocate of devolution whose political identity was shaped by governing a major city rather than leading an ideological faction. His politics combine socially liberal centrist instincts with an Atlanticist outlook and a belief that the British state must work more effectively for communities that feel left behind. His signature concept of “Manchesterism (distinct from the Manchester capitalism of the 19th century),” the idea that devolved government with meaningful fiscal powers can revive regional economies, is the model he hopes to apply nationally. Whether that approach can be translated into a coherent national economic strategy remains an open question.

On domestic policy, Burnham has already outlined several priorities. He has proposed

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Good Morning!

Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence. Thorough, insightful, and industry-focused. We deliver clarity in uncertainty and strength in decision-making. Anticipate, Adapt, and Excel!

Now, on a lighter note, let’s start the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.

Humor of the Week

From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here’s what we’re monitoring:

High Impact Situational Updates

“At Grinfi, we track immediate fragility and systemic contagion to ensure leaders see risks before they spread.”

---

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week.

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Last week, in his first meeting as Federal Reserve Chair, Kevin Warsh led the Federal Open Market Committee to a unanimous vote to keep the benchmark overnight rate at 3.5 to 3.75%, where it has sat since the cuts of late 2025. The committee’s updated dot plot removed the prior projection for a cut this year and lifted the median year-end rate to roughly 3.8%, putting a hike, not a cut, on the table.

Now, it’s important to remember that at the moment, inflation is running at its fastest in more than three years, and Warsh used his debut press conference to signal that the bar for further easing has risen. “Price stability is not negotiable,” he told reporters, framing the energy-driven climb in headline CPI as a risk the committee would not look through. Traders responded immediately, repricing the next move toward a possible hike as early as October and pushing the 10 year Treasury yield to about 4.49%.

The market reaction was unforgiving. The S&P 500 and Nasdaq fell on June 17 as the AI-and-easing trade that powered the

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Good Morning!

Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence. Thorough, insightful, and industry-focused. We deliver clarity in uncertainty and strength in decision-making. Anticipate, Adapt, and Excel!

Now, on a lighter note, let’s start the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.

Humor of the Week

From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here’s what we’re monitoring:

High Impact Situational Updates

“At Grinfi, we track immediate fragility and systemic contagion to ensure leaders see risks before they spread.”

---

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week. We also include a special analysis of the G-7 Summit, which is set to commence today in France.

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Last weekend, hardline demonstrators in Tehran and Mashhad protested the emerging US-Iran peace deal, chanting slogans including "Death to dishonorable Araghchi, the infiltrator" and "Qalibaf, the compromiser." Protesters accused Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf of betraying the legacy of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whose death has become a rallying point for opponents of the agreement. Footage from a Tehran rally on Saturday showed demonstrators demanding the resignation of both officials while waving red and black flags and holding signs reading, "Qalibaf, Araghchi, what about the blood of my Leader?"

The critics targeting Ghalibaf and Araghchi belong to an ultra-conservative faction in parliament aligned with the Paydari Front/Jebhe-ye Paydari (Endurance Front), which includes Hajatoleslam Nabavian (also known as Mahmoud Nabavian), a hardline Shia cleric and MP who acts as the de facto spokesperson for the party on foreign affairs. The faction also includes Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of Keyhan newspaper and a commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who collaborated with Russia in Syria, and circles close to Saeed Jalili, former secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.

Notwithstanding, US President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social yesterday that the agreement is

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Good Morning!

Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence. Thorough, insightful, and industry-focused. We deliver clarity in uncertainty and strength in decision-making. Anticipate, Adapt, and Excel!

Now, on a lighter note, let’s start the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.

Humor of the Week

From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here’s what we’re monitoring:

High Impact Situational Updates

“At Grinfi, we track immediate fragility and systemic contagion to ensure leaders see risks before they spread.”

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week.

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On June 6, hundreds of mostly young Indians gathered at Jantar Mantar in New Delhi, the capital’s designated protest strip, under the banner of the Cockroach Janta Party.

Some wore cockroach masks. Others carried dog-eared exam guides. The party, a deliberate parody of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party, was founded three weeks ago after India’s Chief Justice Surya Kant compared unemployed youth who criticized the government to “cockroaches” and “parasites” during a May 15 court hearing. Kant later said his remarks were taken out of context, but the political damage was already done.

Abhijeet Dipke, a 47-year-old political communications strategist and Boston University student who previously worked with the Aam Aadmi Party, turned the insult into a movement. Within a week of launching social media accounts, the CJP’s Instagram page surpassed both the BJP and the Indian National Congress in followers. It now stands at 22.7 million. The movement has since engaged in offline activities, including clean-up drives and protest rallies.

However, the Indian government continues to dismiss the growth of the online movement, claiming it is powered by Pakistani bots, although the CJP has published evidence disproving these claims. Meanwhile, the founder’s account was hacked, and the movement has been subjected to routine cyber attacks by forces allegedly linked to the Indian government.

Nonetheless, at the June 6 rally, the organizers issued a formal ultimatum: the Modi government has seven days to dismiss Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan over alleged irregularities in major national examinations, or face a nationwide stir. A CJP spokesperson told media this was “just a trailer.” The party holds no registration with the Election Commission of India but has become a channel for anger over unemployment, political corruption, exam scandals, and a broader sense among Indian youth that the system has failed them.

While the immediate threat posed by the organization remains limited, our assessment indicates a gradual but notable delegitimization of established

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Good Morning!

Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence. Thorough, insightful, and industry-focused. We deliver clarity in uncertainty and strength in decision-making. Anticipate, Adapt, and Excel!

Now, on a lighter note, let’s start the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.

Humor of the Week

From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here’s what we’re monitoring:

High Impact Situational Updates

“At Grinfi, we track immediate fragility and systemic contagion to ensure leaders see risks before they spread.”

---

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week.

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The first round results of Colombia’s presidential election, held yesterday, May 31, took a surprising turn. Abelardo de la Espriella, a right-wing lawyer and political outsider, emerged in first place ahead of left-wing Senator Iván Cepeda, the candidate of President Gustavo Petro’s ruling coalition. The established Uribista right and the moderate center were eliminated.

Abelardo de la Espriella was not expected to win the first round. Every major poll published in the final weeks of the campaign had him running second or third, with support ranging between 25% and 31%. Iván Cepeda, the candidate of President Gustavo Petro’s Historic Pact coalition, consistently led the field with 40% to 45% support. The establishment right, represented by Uribista Senator Paloma Valencia, was widely seen as de la Espriella’s main competitor for the anti-Petro vote.

Instead, de la Espriella secured 43.73% of the vote, with more than 99% of ballots counted. Valencia collapsed to below 7%, while Cepeda finished with 40.92%. Both de la Espriella & Cepeda advanced to the June 21 runoff as the only viable contenders. Colombia is now headed toward one of the most ideologically polarized presidential contests in its modern democratic history.

But who is de la Espriella?

He is 47 years old, a lawyer by training, and a political newcomer who has never held elected office. He built his political movement, Defenders of the Homeland, on a platform of tougher security policies, reduced state intervention, and aggressive counternarcotics enforcement. He has spoken favorably of Donald Trump, described Nayib Bukele as a model leader, and campaigned directly against Petro’s “Total Peace” strategy with armed groups. His surprise first round performance suggests that voters seeking change did not divide their support between him and Valencia. Instead, they consolidated behind the candidate they believed was most capable of delivering it.

More than a contest between the two candidates, the June 21 runoff is set to showcase two fundamentally different visions for Colombia’s future. Whichever candidate prevails, a large share of the electorate is likely to be dissatisfied with the outcome.

Beyond the electoral outcome itself, the key question is how Colombia’s risk environment could change under either candidate? A de la Espriella presidency would likely produce the most pro-Washington Colombian government since Álvaro Uribe. He would almost certainly reinstate aerial coca eradication, restore full counternarcotics cooperation with the DEA, and align more closely with US policy toward Venezuela and Cuba. Such a shift could trigger a stronger response from FARC dissident factions and the ELN as armed groups resist renewed security pressure.

A Cepeda victory, by contrast, would likely extend Petro’s left wing agenda, including the Total Peace framework and a more distant relationship with Washington on counternarcotics policy. This would likely mean continued uncertainty in cocaine producing regions, ongoing pressure from the United States over drug policy, and a foreign policy orientation more closely aligned with regional left-wing governments.

Colombia remains the world’s leading cocaine producer, Washington’s most important security partner in Latin America, and a critical component of any regional strategy involving Venezuela. The June 21st runoff will determine the direction of that partnership for the next four years. The next president will take office on July 7.

The runoff arithmetic currently favors de la Espriella. He won the first round by nearly three percentage points despite polling more than 10 points behind only weeks earlier, and much of Valencia’s support is expected to shift toward the anti-left candidate. However, first round momentum does not always translate into victory against a consolidated left wing base. The race is now entering its most intense phase.

President Gustavo Petro has since expressed skepticism about the results. He wrote:

In fact, even before the results were announced, Petro had spent months questioning the integrity of the electoral system. On election day itself, he posted allegations of “corruption rings” within the registrar’s office on social media, raising the possibility of a legitimacy dispute that could complicate the political transition regardless of who wins the runoff.

At the same time, this past week marked arguably the most intense period of US-Iran diplomacy since the war began in late February. By Thursday, May 28, negotiators had reached a tentative memorandum of understanding that would extend the ceasefire by

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Good Morning!

Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence. Thorough, insightful, and industry-focused. We deliver clarity in uncertainty and strength in decision-making. Anticipate, Adapt, and Excel!

Now, on a lighter note, let’s start the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.

Humor of the Week

From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here’s what we’re monitoring:

High Impact Situational Updates

“At Grinfi, we track immediate fragility and systemic contagion to ensure leaders see risks before they spread.”

---

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week.

---

The Trump administration has introduced major immigration policy changes that, together, would significantly affect foreign workers, corporate hiring and compliance, and banking procedures. On May 19, Trump signed an executive order directing Treasury and federal banking regulators to treat immigration status as a financial risk factor and issue guidance within 60 days.

On May 20, the DOJ swore in 82 new immigration judges, many viewed as strongly aligned with the administration’s deportation agenda, marking the largest class in the agency’s history. The administration has also dismissed more than 100 judges since January 2025, in many cases without public explanation, raising concerns about increasing politicization within the immigration court system. At the same time, the addition of new judges comes as the immigration court backlog exceeds 3.7 million cases. On May 21, USCIS issued policy memo PM-602-0199, reframing adjustment of status for green cards as ‘extraordinary discretionary relief’ rather than a standard pathway, increasing the likelihood that many visa holders will need to complete the process abroad through consular processing.

However, it is important to clarify that the policy does not remove or repeal adjustment of status under Section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Rather, it raises the threshold for approval by requiring applicants to demonstrate “unusual or outstanding equities” to justify completing the process while remaining in the United States (i.e. demonstrating deservingness of an ‘administrative grace’). As a result, most applicants would undoubtedly face higher scrutiny, with denials expected to increase, particularly for non-dual intent visa holders such as

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Good Morning!

Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence. Thorough, insightful, and industry-focused. We deliver clarity in uncertainty and strength in decision-making. Anticipate, Adapt, and Excel!

Now, on a lighter note, let’s start the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.

Humor of the Week

From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here’s what we’re monitoring:

High Impact Situational Updates

“At Grinfi, we track immediate fragility and systemic contagion to ensure leaders see risks before they spread.”

---

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week.

---

First, we begin with an emerging health security risk outside the immediate political sphere. Yesterday, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). The outbreak involves the rare Bundibugyo strain. While the WHO noted that the outbreak does not currently meet pandemic thresholds, it warned that neighboring states face elevated exposure risks due to the absence of approved vaccines or therapeutics for this strain.

In Asia-Pacific, the Philippines is experiencing its most severe political crisis since the 2001 ouster of President Joseph Estrada, with growing risks of a potential constitutional crisis and broader political instability. On May 11, the House voted 257 to 25 to impeach Vice President Sara Duterte for the second time. The charges include misuse of confidential public funds (~₱612.5 million), culpable violation of the Constitution, unexplained wealth of more than ~$110 million, bribery, and alleged threats to assassinate President Marcos, First Lady Liza Marcos, and former House Speaker Martin Romualdez. Romualdez has since resigned amid corruption allegations.

This second impeachment was only constitutionally possible because the Supreme Court, in its July 2025 ruling, struck down the first attempt as barred by the one-year rule and set February 6, 2026 as the earliest date a new complaint could be filed.

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At the same time, a pro-Duterte Senate has staged what has been described as a legislative coup. Lawmakers ousted Senate President Tito Sotto and installed Alan Peter Cayetano by a 13 to 9 vote. The decisive 13th vote came from Senator Ronald dela Rosa, the former national police chief under former President Rodrigo Duterte. Dela Rosa had been absent from the Senate since November 2025. Cayetano himself is a longtime Duterte family ally and was Sara Duterte's father's running mate in 2016.

Meanwhile, the ICC unsealed an arrest warrant against Senator Ronald dela Rosa for crimes against humanity. Gunfire erupted in the Senate on May 13 during an attempted arrest. Dela Rosa slipped out at 2:30 am on May 14, reportedly accompanied by Senator Robin Padilla. He remains at large. President Marcos convened an emergency security meeting on the same day. The Senate Sergeant-at-Arms was suspended.

Still in Asia, the Trump-Xi Beijing summit on May 14-15 produced two separate and seemingly contradictory narratives. First, the White House readout stated that

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Good Morning!

Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence. Thorough, insightful, and industry-focused. We deliver clarity in uncertainty and strength in decision-making. Anticipate, Adapt, and Excel!

But first, let’s begin the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.

Humor of the Week

From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here’s what we’re monitoring:

High Impact Situational Updates

“At Grinfi, we track immediate fragility and systemic contagion to ensure leaders see risks before they spread.”

---

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week.

---

Trump departs for Beijing on Wednesday for the May 14-15 summit with Xi Jinping, the first US presidential visit to China since 2017. The likely deliverables are expected to be transactional. All eyes are on potential Chinese purchases of Boeing aircraft and agricultural goods, a bilateral Board of Trade, and an extension of the November 2025 Busan trade truce.

Meanwhile, China appears to be armed with real leverage. Its exports grew 21.8% year-on-year in the first two months of 2026. Beijing has wielded its rare earth dominance to force two US tariff retreats, is buying more than 80% of Iran's shipped oil, and is arriving at the table as an active mediator in the Iran war. In contrast, Trump's approval rating has fallen to 36%, driven by $4.27 national gasoline prices, 4.5% PCE inflation, and a conflict of his own making, among others.

Undoubtedly, what’s clear at the moment is that Xi's confidence is palpable, while Washington's need for a win is urgent. At the same time, the Taiwan question still remains the X-factor.

In the Middle East, the supposed US-Iran MOU has hit a new wall. Iran delivered its formal counter-proposal to the US on Sunday via Pakistani mediators. Iranian state television reported that Tehran rejected the US framework as amounting to surrender. Iran’s counter-proposal did not address the nuclear program. Trump rejected it the same evening in two Truth Social posts: first accusing Iran of

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Good Morning!

Welcome to this week’s edition of Grinfi Political Risk Edge, your trusted source for expert political risk analysis and strategic intelligence. Thorough, insightful, and industry-focused. We deliver clarity in uncertainty and strength in decision-making. Anticipate, Adapt, and Excel!

But first, let’s begin the week with a laugh 😄 to brighten the mood. Remember, a little humor never hurts before moving on to the serious stuff.

Humor of the Week

From Grinfi Political Risk Observatory (GPRO), here’s what we’re monitoring:

High Impact Situational Updates

“At Grinfi, we track immediate fragility and systemic contagion to ensure leaders see risks before they spread.”

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Here are the key issues that are expected to shape political risk this week.

---

After decades of membership in the OPEC cartel, the United Arab Emirates, the group’s third largest producer, has formally exited.

It comes as the ongoing US-Iran war has triggered disruptions/dual blockade in the Persian Gulf, keeping Gulf oil exports well below pre-war levels.

The exit is largely predicated on underlying tensions with Saudi Arabia and dissatisfaction with production quotas that have limited the UAE’s ability to fully utilize its capacity. With the UAE’s departure, OPEC loses

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